- A top US intelligence official said the cyberattack launched by Russia before invading Ukraine “had a major impact”.
- The attack affected a large number of satellite communications stations, affecting hundreds of thousands of people outside Ukraine.
- Both US and Russian officials are wary of the escalation that could follow a massive cyberattack.
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Russia is known for its powerful cyber-warfare capabilities. So it should come as no surprise that Moscow launched cyberattacks against Ukrainian targets in the lead-up to its offensive in late February.
Russian hackers followed various Ukrainian targets in the private and public sectors, but a cyber weapon aimed at a specific military target has spread outside Ukraine and affected thousands of devices.
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Military vehicles on a train in Russia’s southern Rostov region, near the border with the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, February 23, 2022. STRINGER / AFP via Getty Images
Hours before the start of the Russian offensive on February 24, Russian hackers launched a cyber weapon against Viasat, an American satellite communications company that is providing communications services to the Ukrainian military.
The cyberweapon named “Asideran” was a type of malware known as a “wiper” that targeted Viasat modems and routers and wiped all their data before disabling them permanently.
The cyberattack targeted commercial satellite communications networks in an attempt to disrupt Ukrainian military command and control and sow chaos among Ukrainian units on the battlefield as Russian forces crossed the border.
This attack is one of the first examples of a cyber attack used as part of a combined arms operation, in much the same way as an army tank and aircraft used to soften a fortified target before an infantry attack. can use.
However, it appears that Russian hackers let Acideren run amok, either not being able or not able to limit attacks on Ukrainian equipment.
The satellite dish was prepared for the broadcast of the UEFA Euro 2012 tournament in Kharkiv, Ukraine in June 2012. AMA/Corbis via Getty Images
US director of national intelligence Avril Haines told lawmakers this month that the Russian cyberattack “had a major impact” and affected a large number of ground satellite communications stations, also known as Very Small Aperture Terminals, or VSATs. .
As a result, hundreds of thousands of people outside Ukraine were affected in a variety of ways, including losing internet services and power.
When it comes to cyber weapons the potential for such an outcome is high. In order to focus a piece of malware on a specific target, hackers need to specifically design it to do so, and this requires additional work.
For example, the famous Stuxnet virus that targeted the Iranian nuclear program in the late 2000s was designed to remain dormant if it encountered a computer device that did not meet the criteria set by its designers. Which is widely considered to be the US and Israel.
So far, most Russian hackers have followed the usual playbook and launched mainly three types of cyberattacks: wipers to delete data from devices, website malformations to defame and ridicule targets, and network and Distributed denial of service attacks to bring down websites in massive amounts. them with traffic.
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A computer in Russia was hit by the Petya ransomware attack in 2017. Donat SorokinTASS via Getty
Despite its powerful cyber warfare capabilities and a well-documented willingness to use them, even against Western targets, Russia has not launched the great Cyber Armageddon – even as the US and its allies have committed billions. has extended its support for Ukraine by providing dollars. in military and humanitarian aid.
Russia has launched cyber attacks during the conflict, but nowhere near the level that was anticipated before the invasion.
Haynes said, “We have a variety of theories for why this might be, including the fact that we think they may have determined that the collateral effect of such attacks in the context of Ukraine is their will be challenging.” ,
According to Haynes, Moscow has “long-standing concerns” about a potential escalation should it directly target the US in cyberspace, but that does not mean that US intelligence agencies will be able to engage against the US in the future. The Russians are not worried about cyberattacks.
Haines offered another explanation as to why Russia did not launch large-scale cyberattacks against the US and NATO: Moscow wants to retain collection opportunities in Ukraine and elsewhere.
Cyber warfare and intelligence collection often cross paths. Officials tasked with those related duties in Russia and elsewhere are highly likely to share goals – although those goals have their own, often conflicting objectives.
Ukrainian personnel inspect a Russian projectile in a street in Kyiv on February 24, 2022. Sergei Supinsky / AFP via Getty Images
“It’s competition in some sense because of the ‘Intel gain, Intel lose’ mantra,” a former US intelligence officer with a background in signals intelligence told Insider.
“Every time a node is destroyed, it is a low node IC [intelligence community] can tap and squeeze for intelligence,” the former intelligence official said on condition of anonymity, to avoid compromising the ongoing work with the government.
For example, the US Cyber Command wants to take out the Russian military communications node to incur costs should a Russian NATO target launch a devastating cyberattack, but the NSA has tried to suck up valuable intelligence about Russian military movements. Tap the same node for that.
In such scenarios, policy makers have to decide which action is more urgent and how to achieve their strategic objectives in the near and long term.
“That node could have been a valuable intelligence source, but again, you would be taking a primary network, but you help find or identify secondary networks and alternate communication nodes,” the former US intelligence official said. “Then you start making plans to understand and learn more about those networks, gain some insight, understand their weaknesses and learn when and why they are used.”
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army Headquarters), and a graduate of Johns Hopkins University.
